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Abstract
This paper introduces a new high frequency time series of Confederate money prices taken from
the newspapers of Richmond and leading cities in the Eastern Confederacy.  The new Grayback
series is tested for “turning points.”  The empirical analysis suggests that “turning points” in the
Confederate Grayback market were different from those identified in the Union Greenback
market by Willard et al. (1996).  It appears that war did not always have symmetric effects on
Northern and Southern money prices.
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“Financial and commercial matters fluctuate under the successes and
reverses of the war like ebb and tide, and it is not to be wondered
that under the great military events that are now transpiring [ Gettysburg],
there should be a suspension of operations in trade.”
(Richmond Examiner, July 9, 1863, p. 1)
I.  Introduction
Recent studies of Civil War financial markets have largely focused on the role of war
news in asset price determination.  The ‘news’ literature on Civil War asset prices largely centers
on the pioneering work of Wesley Mitchell (1903).  In his famous book,  A History of the
Greenbacks, Mitchell argued that the Greenback price of gold fluctuated in response to news that
changed expectations regarding a return to specie convertibility.  War, fiscal, and political news
moved the price of Northern paper money rather than changes in money supply and money
demand.  Willard,  Guinnane, and Rosen (1996), hereafter WGR, identify “turning points” in the
time path of Union Greenback prices.
1 Their analysis indicates that some events seen as
important to modern day historians of the Civil War, such as  Gettsyburg, were important turning
points.  They also found that some events given little attention in today’s history books, like
General Early’s advance on Washington in July 1864, were also important turning points.  WGR
interpret their findings as evidence that the methodologies traditionally used by historians (i.e.,
letters, diaries, etc.) do not always lead to an accurate assessment of how contemporaries viewed
the past.
One weakness of the literature on Civil War financial markets has been the poor quality
of data from Confederate gold markets.  The absence of a high quality  Grayback series has made
it difficult to compare how investors in the North  and South reacted to events of the Civil War.
This paper introduces a new series of Confederate gold prices taken from the newspapers of2
Richmond and leading cities in the Eastern Confederacy. An exhaustive  search of more than a
dozen primary newspapers yields a gold series of nearly 500 observations during the course of
the Civil War (Figure 1).  A new series of weekly  Grayback money prices is tested for turning
points.  The empirical analysis suggests that turning points in the  Grayback market were
different from those identified in the Union Greenback market (WGR, 1996). Overall, the
findings suggest that investors in the North and South reacted differently to events of the Civil
War.
The paper begins with a review of recent studies on asset price determination in the
Southern Confederacy.  The new data set is described and compared to existing series on
Grayback prices.  This is followed by a turning point analysis of the new money series.  Breaks
in Grayback prices are then compared to those in the Greenback market.  The paper concludes
with a discussion of the implications of the findings for future studies of the American Civil
War, and for war finance in general.
II.  Previous Studies of Asset Prices in the Southern Confederacy
Mitchell hypothesized that Greenback prices during the Civil War fluctuated in response
to news that changed expectations regarding a return to specie convertibility.  In a similar
fashion,  Schwab (1903) examined movements in  Grayback prices.  He noted that Confederate
money prices also seemed to mirror Confederate fortunes on the battlefield.   Schwab chronicled
how Grayback prices rose and fell with Confederate military triumphs and defeats.  The view
that Grayback price movements largely reflected Southern perceptions of the war is supported by3
contemporaries of the period.  E. A. Pollard, editor of the  Richmond Examiner, characterized
Graybacks as the “sinews of war” (Pollard, 1994, p. 415).
Recent studies of  Grayback prices have examined the role of ‘news’ in asset price
determination using time series econometrics.  Davis and  Pecquet (1990) were unable to reject
the hypothesis that Confederate money prices contain a unit root, providing empirical evidence
that Graybacks followed a random walk.  The presence of a stochastic trend in  Grayback prices
supports the view that Confederate money prices fluctuated in response to news that changed
expectations regarding a return to specie convertibility.  However, Davis and  Pecquet’s study
was limited because Grayback prices were not available for the first and last years of the war.
Burdekin and Langdana (1993) looked at the relationship between war news and  Lerner’s
Price Index, a monthly measure of prices based on 20 commodities taken from newspapers of
major cities in the Eastern Confederacy.  They plotted commodity inflation on a graph and
associated price movements with war news.  They concluded that war news was a proxy for the
future values of money and debt issues by the Confederate government.  War news was an
instrument for fiscal news and therefore an important determinant of the Confederate price level.
McCandless (1996) employed a semimonthly series of  Grayback prices to examine the
impact of war shocks on  short-run changes in Union and Confederate money prices.  His
analysis suggests that war news was the single most important determinant of currency prices
during the Civil War.  Battles  proxied for future money financing by the Northern and Southern
governments.  Military engagements are assumed to emit a common symmetric signal such that a
Northern victory (defeat) causes an appreciation (depreciation) in Greenback prices and an equal
depreciation (appreciation) in  Grayback prices.4
More recent studies of Confederate asset prices during the American Civil War have
focused on the impact of war news on Confederate cotton bond prices trading in London.  Brown
and Burdekin (2000) estimate turning points in cotton bond prices.  Although their analysis is
limited by a relatively small sample size (109 observations), their results indicate that Atlanta
was a turning point not found in  WGR’s analysis of Union Greenbacks.   They argue that the
more than doubling of Confederate cotton bond prices between December 1863 and September
1864 can be largely attributed to two factors: the slow pace of Union advances during the first
nine months of 1864 and the possible election of  McClellan as President of the United States on
a peace party ticket.  They conclude that war did not always have symmetric effects on Union
and Confederate asset prices.  Weidenmier (2000) analyzes movements in the cotton bonds with
a vector autoregression.  His results suggest that the large rise in Confederate cotton bond prices
during 1864 can be explained by a rise in the price of cotton.   Weidenmier’s findings indicate
that cotton, not war news, was the most important determinant of bond prices.
III.  Graybacks and the Richmond Gold Market
As noted above, the seemingly poor quality of Grayback price data has limited previous
studies of Confederate gold markets.  Researchers have either analyzed monthly  Grayback prices
or relied on higher frequency data from secondary sources of unknown origin.   McCandless’
(1996) analysis of Union and Confederate money prices, for example, utilized a semimonthly
series of Grayback prices taken from an unidentified newspaper clipping glued to the back of a
library book.  This is unfortunate because a much richer gold series can be obtained by
examining Richmond market reports in local newspapers and nearby cities in the Eastern
Confederacy.5
An extensive search of more than a dozen newspapers indicates the presence of a liquid
money market where investors speculated on the  Grayback price of a gold dollar in the
Confederate capital.  Primary sources yield a series of 486  Grayback price quotations from
public auctions and private brokerage trades between May 27, 1861 and February 15, 1865
(Figure 1).  All quotes are taken from Richmond except during some stretches in the summer and
fall of 1864 when Richmond newspapers stopped reporting money prices.  These periods are
filled in by gold price quotations from the nearby Wilmington, NC money market, whose prices
were often quoted in the Richmond newspapers.
2  Multiple price quotes are generally available
for most weeks of the war and trading volume also appears to have been quite high in the
Richmond exchange.  The  Richmond Whig reports trades totaling $4,900 in gold coin on January
22, 1864, $2,500 on March 24, 1864, $2,000 on September 1, 1864, and $1,150 on November
11, 1864.  Investors apparently continued to actively trade  Graybacks and gold into the early
stages of 1865.  The Petersburg Express reported January 23, 1865 that over $1,000 in gold coin
exchanged hands “on Monday morning last (p. 1).”
The new  Grayback series reveals many discrepancies with the data employed by
McCandless (1996) and other secondary sources.  The series employed by McCandless (1996) as
well as another published in the  New York Evening Post - also of unknown origin- often report
constant Grayback prices for weeks or even months.
3  Both price series give the false impression
of an inactive and illiquid Confederate money market.  On the contrary, as noted above, the
Grayback traded regularly with significant fluctuations over short time intervals.  Second, it is
not clear whether the  Grayback series employed by  McCandless are bid, ask, or transactions
prices.  The  McCandless series also continues to quote  Grayback prices after the fall of
Richmond in April 1865.  It seems unlikely that there would be any market transactions at this6
point in time.  Indeed, a search of primary newspapers in Richmond and the surrounding  areas
fails to uncover any Grayback trades whatsoever during this period.  The evidence suggests that
it is difficult to accept the results from previous studies of the  Grayback market that employ
semimonthly data of dubious quality.
IV.  Turning Points in Grayback Prices
This paper aims to estimate turning points in Confederate  Grayback money prices.  A
weekly price series of 195 observations covering May 27, 1861 to February 15, 1865 is
constructed from the full sample (486 observations) of Grayback prices (see Table 1).
4  A weekly
series is employed in the empirical analysis because  Graybacks did not trade every day.  By
combining trading data over the week, one avoids a  nonsynchronous trading problem, producing
more reliable statistical results.
5 Although  Grayback prices are not available at the daily
frequency of Union Greenback prices, this new weekly price series is almost twice as large as the
semimonthly series employed by  McCandless (1996).  The new Grayback price series can then
be used to estimate turning points that can be compared to those identified in the Union
Greenback market by WGR (1996).  This provides new insight into how investors in the North
and South perceived events of the Civil War.
The new Grayback series is tested for turning points using a procedure developed by
Brown and Burdekin (2000).  This methodology is a variant of the technique employed by WGR
(also see Banerjee et al., 1996), necessarily modified to account for weekly data.  The following
equation is estimated to identify breakpoints in Southern money prices.7
,   +   p ln       +     =   p ln  t i t- 1 0 t e b b (1)
where pt is the natural logarithm of the  Grayback price of a gold dollar at time t, b0 is a constant,
pt-1 is the natural logarithm of the  Grayback price of a gold dollar lagged one-period, and  et is the
error term at time t.  Equation (1) is estimated over each 12 week sub-sample that is the
approximate size of a “window” (100 days) employed in  WGR’s analysis of daily Union
Greenback prices.  For example, equation (1) is estimated over the first twelve-week period, June
7, 1861 to September 1, 1861.  An R
2 is calculated and retained from this regression.  The sample
period is then moved forward one week, dropping the first week of the sample, June 7, 1861, and
adding the thirteenth week, September 8, 1861.  An R
2 is then saved from this second regression.
The analysis continues in this fashion until R
2’s from all 184 twelve-week intervals have been
estimated.
5  The R
2’s from each “window” are then plotted on a graph and used to identify
periods where a structural break was most likely to have occurred.  A low R
2 value indicates a
poor statistical fit and suggests the possibility of a turning point.   A plot of the R
2s from the
empirical analysis, presented in Figure 2, suggests that there are six possible turning points: late
November to early December 1861, September to October of 1862, February to March of 1863,
late July to early September 1863, late February to March of 1864, and late April to early June
1864.
The next step in the empirical analysis is to test for the presence of a turning point within
each twelve-week window where there was a potential breakpoint.  Equation (1) is augmented
with a dummy variable and each window is expanded to fifteen weeks on either side of a
potential breakpoint.  Each 31 week window is sequentially estimated with a rolling dummy
variable that takes a value of zero prior to that particular week in the window and a value of one8
for all weeks that follow.  Turning points are identified by the maximum t-statistic, in absolute
value, on the rolling dummy variable for each  31 week window.  As noted by Brown and
Burdekin (2000), the 31 week sample is substantially smaller than the 150 day sample employed
by WGR, reducing the power of the test in detecting turning points in  Grayback prices.
The empirical analysis identifies 4 turning points that are plotted in Figure  3.
6  Table 2
presents a list of  Grayback turning points that are followed by those identified in  WGR’s
analysis of Union Greenbacks.  The first turning point, October 17, 1862, occurs with the
Confederate defeat at Sharpsburg (Antietam).  The second breakpoint coincides with the passage
of the Union Finance and Conscription Bills.  This is followed by a  Gettysburg turning point that
also shows up in WGR’s analysis of Greenback prices.  The final turning point appears to have
averaged the impact of two breakpoints brought on by the Confederate Currency Reform Act of
1864 and battles in Virginia at  Spottsylvania and the Wilderness.
The first and third turning points,  Antietam and  Gettysburg, correspond to breakpoints
identified in  WGR’s analysis of Union Greenbacks.
7  The existence of common shifts with these
two major events provides a special opportunity to examine how  Grayback and Greenback
investors reacted to important war news.  Table 2 indicates that Confederate and Union monies
depreciated following the Southern defeat at  Antietam.  As noted by modern historians, this
bloody battle not only halted Lee’s Northern Invasion but was crucial in keeping foreign powers
from coming to the aid of the Confederacy (Catton, 1965, 1971).  The depreciation in the
Greenback is inconsistent with  McCandless’ (1996) argument that war is a symmetric process
(i.e., what is good for one side is necessarily bad for the other).  WGR  intrepret the rise in the
gold premium as an indication that  Antietam/Emancipation Proclamation put an end to the
notion that the Civil War would be short-lived.  Rather, the Civil War would be a long and9
expensive conflict that would call for additional issues of Greenbacks, delaying a return to specie
convertibility.   Antietam appears to have revised investors’ forecasts of the future cost of the
war, producing a rise in the gold premium in the  Northern money market. The depreciation in
Greenback and Grayback prices alike following  Antietam suggests that war can have asymmetric
effects on money prices if both sides view a battle as increasing the cost of the war.
The results also indicate that  Gettysburg did have symmetric effects on money prices.
The Grayback depreciated 20% following news of the Confederate defeat at Gettsysburg, while
the long-run appreciation in the Greenback was estimated to be 31.2% (for a 12 week interval).
The existence of a Gettysburg turning point in the  Grayback and Greenback markets indicates
that both sides recognized the importance of the battle.   Gettysburg, like Antietam, was a major
military event that fundamentally changed how investors viewed the fortunes of the North and
South.
Another striking feature of Table 2 is that Confederate turning points at  Antietam and
Gettysburg occur much later than breakpoints identified for these same battles in the Union
Greenback market.  This might be because war news reached the Union Gold Room well before
Confederate investors were informed.  A reading of Richmond newspapers supports this
interpretation.  Although the Union Gold Room has been described as a “quicker messenger of
successes and defeats than the tardier telegrams of the Associated Press” ( Medberry, 1870, p.
214, also quoted in WGR, 1996, p. 1004), the same can not be said of the Richmond gold
exchange.  Contemporary newspapers indicate that the Confederate government censored war
news, especially after costly defeats at Antietam and  Gettsyburg.  For example, news of the fall
of Vicksburg was announced in the Richmond gold market before the defeat of  Gettysburg.  This
is quite surprising considering that  Vicksburg was located hundreds of miles to the west and fell10
the same day Lee’s army began its retreat from  Gettysburg.  A reporter for the Richmond
Dispatch alluded to the government’s censorship of war news regarding  Gettysburg in an article
written 10 days after the battle:
We have no official account of the battle Gettysburg, although we should think that the
authorities must surely have received one before this…The battle of  Gettysburg was a
triumphant success-an overwhelming victory. We beat the enemy on all three of the days…That
he [Lee] was repulsed in his attack on the  entrenchments- that he fled in disorder- that his army
was demoralised-are Yankee lies of the first magnitude. ( Richmond Dispatch, July 13, 1863, p.
1)
It appears that the Confederate government intentionally blocked the dissemination of
bad war news about the critical loss suffered at Gettysburg.  As a result, it was probably difficult
for traders in Richmond to make informed forecasts about the future price of  Graybacks.
However, the government could only keep the public misinformed for a limited time.  As more
news reports arrived in the Richmond market, it became clear that  Gettysburg was a costly defeat
for the South.  The  Grayback depreciated nearly 20% between July 10 and July 17, 1863,
highlighting the close link between money prices and Southern fortunes on the battlefield.
The remaining  Grayback turning points do not match breaks in Union Greenback prices.
The March 7, 1863 breakpoint coincides with the passage of the Finance and Conscription Bills
by the United States Congress.  The Finance Bill authorized a new issue of $150 million
Greenbacks for war finance.  The Conscription Act called for the enlistment of all males between
the ages of twenty and forty-five for a period of three years.  The draft law potentially provided
the United States with 3 million additional soldiers for a period of 3 years.  The length of service
was probably a signal to Grayback investors of Northern resolve to restore the Union.  New York
dailies cheered the acts as pieces of legislation that would “bring the Confederacy to its knees”
(Richmond Dispatch, March 3, 1863).  In contrast, the Confederate press seemed shocked that11
the United States possessed the fortitude to enact such far reaching measures.  Newspaper
accounts from the  Richmond Dispatch suggest that Southerners were surprised by the two
measures.  Many Confederates apparently did not believe Yankees had the “stomach for war.”
In turn,  Graybacks depreciated as investors revised their assessment of Union willingness to
wage war.
8
The final breakpoint identified in the empirical analysis, April 22, 1864, appears to take
place in between two likely turning points appearing in Figure 2: a major break sometime
between February and April 1864 and a smaller break in May.  The plot of the R
2’s suggests that
the “windows” procedure employed in the empirical analysis has effectively averaged the two
turning points. The first break coincides with the passage of the February 17, 1864 Currency
Reform Act that reduced the South’s money supply by one-third.
9  The reform took effect April
1, 1864 in the Confederacy east of the Mississippi River.  The second break, occurring sometime
in mid to late May, can probably be attributed to the battles at  Spottsylvania and Wilderness
when Lee temporarily halted Grant’s advance on Richmond.
The powerful impact of the currency reform in Southern financial markets is perhaps best
illustrated by comparing the time path of  Grayback prices in Richmond with those in Houston,
where the reform was scheduled to take place three months later on July 1, 1864.   Burdekin and
Weidenmier (1999) show that the Richmond and Houston gold markets were  cointegrated until
the Currency Reform Act of 1864, even though the surrender of Vicksburg in July 1863 split the
Confederacy in half.  After April 1864,  Grayback prices in Richmond and Houston diverge.
Grayback prices in Richmond stabilized for most of 1864 while  Graybacks in Houston continued
to depreciated. The rise in the gold premium in Houston, but not Richmond, stems from the fact
that monetary authorities in areas west of the Mississippi River were largely unable to carry out12
the provisions of the reform during 1864.  New currency could not be transported across the
Mississippi River, meaning that old  Grayback currency remained the predominant medium of
exchange in Houston throughout 1864.  Consequently, old  Grayback prices in Houston provide
an opportunity to carry out a natural experiment; what would the  Grayback price of gold been in
Richmond if there was not a monetary reform?  By November 1864, old  Graybacks in Houston
traded at prices of 50 for 1 (gold dollar) while new currency in the east was quoted at prices of
28 to 1 (gold dollar). The divergence of currency values in the east and west persisted for the
remainder of the war, even after Western authorities exchanged old money for new, illustrating
the importance of the Currency Reform Act in Southern financial markets.
Confederate authorities ultimately repealed the 33% tax on money balances in late
December 1864.  The empirical analysis failed to uncover a turning point during this period.
This is not very surprising considering that the reform’s repeal occurred at the end of the sample
where trend break analysis has low  power.
10   Nevertheless, the  Grayback depreciated
approximately 25% between late December 1864 and the first week of January 1865.  This
suggests that both the implementation and repeal of the Currency Reform Act were major events
in Confederate financial markets.
V.  Conclusion
This paper introduces a new high frequency time series of  Grayback money prices.  The
new data set is tested for turning points that are compared to those identified in the Union
Greenback market by WGR.  Like WGR’s analysis of Greenback prices, the results suggest that
there were only a few events that can be classified as turning points based on the actual financial13
market decisions of the day.  In accordance with modern day historians, the analysis suggests
that Greenback and Grayback investors recognized the importance of  Gettysburg and Antietam
as pivotal events of the war. The existence of common shifts with these particular battles offers
insight into how investors interpreted battles of the Civil War.  The results indicate that
Grayback and Greenback investors viewed  Antietam as a crucial turning point that ended the
prospect of a short war.  In turn, both  Graybacks and Greenbacks depreciated as investors
increased their estimates of the future cost of the war.   Gettysburg, on the other hand, had a
symmetric impact on Civil War money prices.  Financial market participants from both sides saw
Gettysburg as a turning point that increased the North’s victory prospects while dealing a
crushing blow to the Confederacy.
As for the other breakpoints, it appears that Northern and Southern investors reacted
differently to news.  An empirical analysis of the  Grayback market did not uncover turning
points with Early’s attack on Washington in July 1864, rumors of a peace conference, or with the
proposal to increase the supply of Greenbacks by $150 million in January 1864 (Table 2).
Instead, the results suggest that Grayback investors reacted negatively when the United States
passed legislation authorizing the conscription of 3 million men and the issue of 3 million
additional Greenbacks, anticipating its negative implications for the Confederacy’s chances of
survival.  The Confederate Currency Reform Act and Wilderness/ Spottsylvania –to a lesser
extent- also appear to have been major events in Southern financial markets. Overall, a turning
point analysis of  Grayback money prices, combined with  WGR’s analysis of Greenbacks,
suggests that Northern and Southern investors reacted differently to events of the Civil War and
that war news did not always have symmetric effects on Civil War money prices.14
Endnotes
1.  Smith and Smith (1997) also provide an analysis of Union Greenback prices using a
stochastic switching model augmented with dummy variables to isolate the impact of
important news events given by Mitchell (1903).  Their analysis indicates that these events
can account for 17% of the total variation in wartime money returns.
2.  All prices are taken from the Richmond gold market except during the summer and fall of
1864.  Newspapers from Petersburg, VA, Raleigh, NC, Lynchburg, VA, Mobile, AL,
Wilmington, NC, Augusta, GA, Columbus, GA, Charleston, SC were also examined for price
quotes from the Richmond market (see Notes to Table 1).  Often these papers would quote
trades not reported in the Richmond newspapers.  In addition, secondary markets existed in
most of these cities, although these gold exchanges tended to be considerably less liquid than
the Richmond market.  A comparison of gold price quotations across cities in the Eastern
Confederacy indicates that the precious metal markets were well integrated.  Price spreads
between the different markets were generally very small.
3.  The Grayback series employed by McCandless (1996) and the price list appearing in the  New
York Evening Post are not even consistent with each other.  For example, the latter reports
the Grayback price of a gold dollar at 34 for 1 on January 1, 1865 while the former list the
price at 60 for 1 on the same date.  There are many discrepancies between the two  prices
series, especially late in the war.  This suggests that neither price list  provides a fair
representation of the time path of Grayback money prices during the war.
4.  Ask prices (the price at which brokers sold gold at auctions and private trades)  are used to
construct the weekly Grayback series.  These are the prices most frequently quoted in the
newspapers.  Ideally, one would like to form a Grayback series using an average of bid and15
ask prices.  Although some bid-ask prices are available, there are not enough to form a
complete price list.  To maintain consistency, ask prices were used to construct the  Grayback
price series.  The use of ask prices introduces some “noise” into the data set, but the new
Grayback series is still of undoubtedly higher quality than currently existing series.
5.   As discussed by Brown and Burdekin (2000), the R
2 analysis and the 12-week windows are
equivalent to the first two steps in the procedure utilized by WGR.  However, unlike WGR,
formal F-tests are not applied in the empirical analysis because the underlying distribution of
the test statistics is unknown in small samples ( 12 week windows).
6.  An exploratory analysis was also carried out using all available  Grayback price quotations.
These results confirm the results using the weekly data, the only difference being that the
turning point might have  fallen two or three days before or after the break identified in the
weekly series.  The results using every observation are available from the author by request.
7.  It is impossible to separate out the effects of Gettysburg and Vicksburg on Union Greenback
prices because news of the two battles arrived at approximately the same time in the Gold
Room.  However, in the case of the South, news of the fall of Vicksburg reached the
Richmond market days before news about the battle of Gettysburg.  This is discussed below
in the forthcoming analysis.
8.  It is interesting to note that there is not a Greenback turning point associated with the Finance
and Conscription Bills.  Perhaps Greenback investors saw the positive aspects of this
legislation offset by it being a signal of a more costly, extended conflict.
9.  For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Confederate Currency Reform Act of 1864,
see Pecquet (1987).  Lerner (1954, 1955, 1956) also describes the impact of the Currency
Reform Act in the Eastern Confederacy.16
10. There is also a large appreciation in  Grayback money prices that occurs in mid to late
January 1865 (see Figures 1 and 3).  The decline in the gold premium is unexpected at this
late stage of the war, given the South’s unfavorable military situation.  The appreciation
appears to follow from the sale of large gold stocks by the Confederate government (see
Morgan, 1985).17
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Table 1
The Grayback Price of a Gold Dollar
Date Price Date Price Date Price
1861 November 8 1.20 April 18* 1.76
May 31  1.12 November 15 1.20 April 25 1.80
June 7 1.10 November 22 1.20 May 2 2.00
June 14 1.12 November 29 1.25 May 9 2.00
June 21 1.10 December 6 1.30 May 16 2.00
June 28 1.10 December 13 1.30 May 23 2.00
July 5 1.10 December 20 1.35 May 30 2.00
July 12 1.10 December 27 1.35 June 6 2.00
July 19 1.10 1862 June 13 2.00
July 26 1.10 January 3 1.35 June 20 2.00
August 2 1.10 January 10 1.30 June 27 2.00
August 9 1.12 January 17 1.30 July 4 2.00
August 16 1.12 January 24 1.30 July 11 2.00
August 23 1.12 January 31 1.28 July 18 2.00
August 30 1.12 February 7 1.28 July 25 2.00
September 6 1.12 February 14 1.40 August 1 2.00
September 13 1.15 February 21 1.40 August 8 2.00
September 20* 1.15 February 28 1.50 August 15 2.10
September 27* 1.15 March 7 1.50 August 22 2.30
October 4* 1.15 March 14 1.50 August 29 2.35
October 11 1.15 March 21 1.50 September 5 2.40
October 18 1.15 March 28 1.50 September 12 2.40
October 25 1.20 April 4 1.75 September 19 2.40
November 1 1.20 April 11 1.76 September 26 2.4019
Table 1
The Grayback Price of a Gold Dollar
Date Price Date Price Date Price
October 3 2.40 March 13 5.00 August 28 12.00
October 10 2.40 March 20 5.25 September 4 12.00
October 17 2.40 March 27 3.40 September 11 13.00
October 24 2.80 April 3 5.00 September 18 12.50
October 31 3.50 April 10 5.50 September 25 11.50
November 7 3.30 April 17 5.75 October 2 12.50
November 14 3.30 April 24 5.50 October 9 12.50
November 21 3.30 May 1 5.00 October 16 11.50
November 28 3.25 May 8 6.50 October 23 12.50
December 5 3.25 May 15 5.25 October 30 12.50
December 12 3.30 May 22 6.00 November 6 12.50
December 19 3.25 May 29 6.25 November 13 15.00
December 26 3.25 June 5 7.00 November 20 16.75
1863 June 12 8.00 November 27 17.00
January 2 3.25 June 19 8.50 December 4 17.00
January 9 3.05 June 26 8.50 December 11 21.00
January 16 3.10 July 3 8.25 December 18 18.00
January 23 3.20 July 10 7.50 December 25 20.00
January 30 3.05 July 17 10.00 1864
February 6 3.25 July 24 11.00 January 1 20.00
February 13 3.30 July 31 11.00 January 8 22.00
February 20 3.30 August 7 12.00 January 15 22.00
February 27 3.40 August 14 13.00 January 22 21.00
March 6 4.50 August 21* 13.00 January 29 20.5020
Table 1
The Grayback Price of a Gold Dollar
Date Price Date Price Date Price
February 5 22.00 July 22** 18.00 1865
February 12 22.50 July 29** 19.00 January 6 49.50
February 19 22.00 August 5** 18.00 January 13 50.00
February 26 27.00 August 12** 19.00 January 20 66.50
March 4 27.50 August 19** 19.00 February 3 45.00
March 11 22.00 August 26** 20.00 February 10** 45.00
March 18 22.00 September 2 20.00 February 17** 45.00
March 25 21.25 September 9 23.00
April 1 23.00 September 16 25.00
April 8 23.00 September 23 25.00
April 15 26.00 September 30 25.00
April 22 23.00 October 7** 25.00
April 29 21.00 October 14** 23.00
May 6** 21.25 October 21** 23.00
May 13** 18.00 October 28** 26.00
May 20** 18.00 November 4 25.00
May 27** 16.00 November 11 28.00
June 3** 17.00 November 18 28.00
June 10** 16.00 November 25 28.00
June 17** 17.00 December 2 29.00
June 24** 17.00 December 9 34.50
July 1** 17.00 December 16 34.75
July 8** 17.00 December 23** 36.00
July 15** 17.00 December 30 40.0021
Notes to Table 1
*Grayback/gold price quotations were unavailable for these particular weeks.  The  Grayback
price of gold has been interpolated for these particular dates assuming a constant price from the
last available trade.
**Prices were not reported in the Richmond newspapers for these particular dates.  The gaps
were filled in with  Grayback/gold price quotations from the Wilmington, North Carolina money
market.  All Wilmington gold price quotations are taken from the  Wilmington Daily Journal.
Grayback/gold price quotations were taken from the following newspapers: Richmond Dispatch,
Richmond Examiner, Richmond Whig, Richmond Enquirer, Petersburg Express, Wilmington
Journal, Columbus Daily-Sun, Charleston Mercury, Lynchburg Virginian, and the Mobile
Tribune.  Richmond Grayback/gold price quotations were also cross-checked against prices in
the Raleigh, Augusta, and Mobile gold markets using the following newspapers:  Raleigh Weekly
Register, Mobile Tribune, Mobile Advertiser and Register, and Augusta Daily Constitutionalist.22
Table 2
Confederate Grayback Turning Points vs. Union Greenback Turning Points
Turning Points in Grayback Money Prices
Percentage 
Change in Significance Major News
Date Grayback Price Level  of the Week
October 21, 1862  -15.22 0.059 Antietam
March 6, 1863 -19.22 0.005   Finance/Conscription Bills
July 17,1863 -20.44 0.011 Gettysburg
April 22, 1864    9.83 0.051 Currency Reform/Wilderness-
Spottsylvania
Turning Points in Greenback Money Prices identified by WGR
Percentage Long-Run
Change in Percentage Change
Date Greenback Price in Price Major Events
September 23, 1862          -0.44 -8.8 Antietam/Emancipation
Proclamation Announced
January 8, 1863              -1.40              -28.0 Proposal to Increase
Supply of Greenbacks by
$300 million
July 6, 1863 1.56 31.2 Gettysburg and Vicksburg
August 27, 1863              -0.63              -12.6 Unknown
July 12,1864 4.80 96.0 Early’s army retreats
August 24, 1864 0.40   8.0 Peace Conference Rumors
March 8, 1865 2.60 52.0 UnknownFigure 1 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Currency Reform Act 
Wilderness/Spottsylvania
Gettysburg